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 Corporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of
Network Access - A Model of the German Gas Sector
by
Georg Meran and Christian von Hirschhausen∗
This paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional
ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model
of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monop-
sonistic gas customer ﬁx quantities and the network access price, whereas the
competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household
customers are excluded from the agreement. The results are then compared
with the outcome of traditional ex-ante regulation. We ﬁnd that while indus-
trial self-regulation leads to an exploitation of households, the eﬀect on the
foreign producers is unclear. (JEL: L51, L13, D43, L95).
1 Introduction
The issue of ”optimal” regulation of network industries is a recurring one in the litera-
ture on institutions and regulation, but it has attracted renewed attention in the course
of the debate on the pros and cons of industrial ”self-regulation”. There is a growing
body of literature on the eﬀects of new institutional forms of regulation, that calls into
question the beneﬁts of ex-ante regulation (for a discussion see Starkie, 2000, Engel,
2002, Brunekreeft, 2002). This literature compares various forms of external regulation
by an independent, but generally badly-informed regulator to internal regulation by in-
dustry itself, or ”self-regulation”. However, empirical ﬁndings on this topic are scarce,
thus the regulatory process is assumed to be less eﬃcient based only on stylized facts.
New evidence comes from the process of European energy market liberalization, where
traditional ”UK-style” structural and ex-ante regulation has been complemented by self-
regulation through association agreements, as used in the German electricity and gas
industries. These agreements are cartel-type, private contracts negotiated between the
main domestic players in the industry, accompanied by weak ex-post control exercised by
∗The authors are with DIW Berlin, and Berlin University of Technology; e-mail: gmeran@diw.de, and
cvh@wip.tu-berlin.de. We thank Pio Baake, Karsten Neuhoﬀ, and Reimund Schwarze for comments; the
paper has also beneﬁted from a presentation at the Workshop for Applied Infrastructure Research at
Berlin University of Technology (October 2003). The usual disclaimer applies.
1an anti-monopoly agency (e.g. the German Cartel Oﬃce). Until recently, the ”German
way” was judged by its own proponents, the German energy industry and large parts
of the political establishment, as a liberalization success story, whereas outsiders tended
to view the self-regulated regime with suspicion. To date there has been no adequate
theoretical discussion of the issue. 1
In this paper, we compare the outcomes of diﬀerent institutional settings regulating net-
work access to monopolistic bottlenecks. These settings range from self-regulated asso-
ciation agreements with no competition policy, to ex-ante regulation combined with a
pro-competition policy. We develop a model of regulatory policies in the German gas
industry, where self-regulation was implemented ﬁve years ago, and where empirical evi-
dence of its eﬀects is beginning to emerge. In contrast to other network industries such
as electricity, railways, and telecommunications, the diﬀerent regulatory regimes in the
gas industry have yet to be analyzed thoroughly. Our hypothesis is that although ex-
ante regulation of network access tariﬀs is superior in terms of social welfare, it does not
necessarily improve the situation of all of the parties concerned. Thus, diﬀerent sets of
policies may beneﬁt diﬀerent interest groups (i.e. incumbent producers, potential market
entrants, industrial consumers, household consumers).
Self-regulation has been discussed in the literature with regard as an alternative to ex-
ternal, ex-ante regulation, in particular if it is associated with a credible ”regulatory
threat”.2 This is a situation where the government threatens to implement a formal reg-
ulatory procedure if the results of self-regulation proved unsatisfactory, i.e. access prices
beyond a critical level. Thus, Starkie (2000) argues that the (privately owned) British
Airport Authority’s imposition of a voluntary price cap on two of its airports (Glasgow
and Edinburgh) was a self-restraint induced by the threat of severe ex-ante regulation.
The German electricity and gas sectors can also be examined fruitfully in this context:
Brunekreeft (2002) was the ﬁrst to analyze the association agreements in the German
electricity sector, showing that the absolute and relative levels of access charges can be
explained by the changing regulatory threats of the German Federal Cartel Oﬃce (FCO,
Bundeskartellamt). Engel (2002) argues that self-regulation may have the advantages of
lower transaction costs and better use of technical knowledge; but there is no evidence
that this solution is always superior.
In this paper, we apply an IO-approach to comparing diﬀerent regulatory regimes in the
gas industry, taking the German situation as background. The next section presents styl-
ized facts and summarizes the recent policy debate. Section three sketches the players and
the setting of the model, and derives the solutions for two extreme market forms: bilateral
monopoly between the vertically integrated gas producer and the monopsonistic industrial
gas consumer, and a pure competitive market. Subsequently, we analyze the eﬀects of the
self-regulation association agreement in force until recently in the gas industry. Section
1Within the European Union, Germany is the only country to have opted for unregulated negotiated
third party access (NTPA) to the network, whereas most other countries have chosen regulated TPA with
a strong role for regulatory agencies.
2”Regulatory threat can be deﬁned as the change of the probability of an intervention upon an agent’s
behavior by some outside authority as a response to the agent’s prior behavior.” (Brunekreeft, 2002, 2).
2four compares the results from diﬀerent mixtures of regulation and competition policy.
Section ﬁve concludes.
2 Institutional Setting
Since the EU Directives 96/92 and 98/30 on electricity and gas liberalization,energy sec-
tor reform has been high on the policy agenda throughout the European Union. However,
results achieved thus far have been modest, due to numerous problems of implementation,
in particular in the gas industry.3 Vertical unbundling and the introduction of competition
in gas production have made only sluggish progress. The slow progress of reform is criti-
cized frequently by the European Commission (2003) in its yearly benchmarking reports.
The German solution of self-regulation has been a central focus of the benchmarking re-
ports, and the absence of ex-ante regulation has been interpreted as an explanation for
the high gas price level in the country.
The institutional framework of self-regulation in the gas industry thus far is follows: ver-
tical integration between gas transmission and the dominant wholesale trader, and no
regulation of network access or expansion. Instead, network access is self-regulated be-
tween the incumbent monopolist, representatives of industry and large industrial users.
The association agreement (so-called Verb¨ andevereinbarung’ on network access and other
key issues was negotiated by the Association of Germany Industry (BDI), the Association
of Industrial Energy and Power Users (VIK), the Association of the German Gas and
Water Industry (BGW), and the Association of Communal Utilities (VKU). Foreign pro-
ducers, traders, and non-industrial customers were thus far deliberately excluded from the
negotiations. The German Cartel Oﬃce exercised only passive ex-post control to prevent
the abuse of a dominant position.
Whereas opinions are divided on whether the assocation agreements have worked in elec-
tricity, there is a negative assesssment of the agreements in the gas industry, shared by
large consumers (VIK), the household consumers, and the Federal Government. Prices
have remained high, third party access has been negligible, and competition has emerged
for only a few large customers (European Commission, 2003).
The topic has signiﬁcantly picked up speed with the implementation of the new EU Gas
Directive (2003/55/EC, the so-called ”Acceleration Directive”), which will oblige Ger-
many to abandon its own Sonderweg of self-regulation. The Directive provides that each
Member State will have to designate one or more competent bodies to act as regulatory
energy authority. Under increasing pressure from European policy and mounting criticism
from policy advisors and the research community in Germany, the German government
agreed to subordinate the gas industry to the inter-sectoral regulatory agency of network
industries in Germany (RegTP) in 2004. Whatever this new regulatory agency will do,
the debate over pros and cons of self-regulation will continue, and discussions about a new
association agreement to prevent the implementation of the regulatory authority may also
3See Newbery (2003) for a survey of electricity sector reform, and Brunekreeft (2002) for an account of
the regulatory process and self-regulation in the German electricity sector. Cremer, et al., (2003) deﬁne
the welfare-optimal access prices to a gas network.
3be revived It is therefore crucial to understand the possible implications of the move from
self-regulation to ex-ante regulation, to which we now turn.
3 The model
3.1 Players and setting
We begin by deﬁning the players and their behaviour in the gas market. The gas market
consists of two groups of suppliers, the cartelized German gas industry (indexed ”BGW”,
the Association of the German Gas and Water Industry), and small foreign gas suppliers
we refer to as the third party (indexed ”TP”). The demand side is dominated by large in-
dustry users, who are represented by the Association of Industrial Energy and Power Users
(VIK). Domestic households and small industries generate the residual market demand
(indexed ”HH”).
Let us ﬁrst describe the behaviour of the competitive fringe, consisting of the third party
and domestic households.
Proﬁts of the third party (TP) are4
πTP = (p − a)qTP − CTP(qTP) (1)
where CTP(qTP) is a convex cost function, p is the gas market price and a the access fee
set by the association agreement. Proﬁts πTP are maximized by choosing qTP so as to
meet the ﬁrst order condition:
(p − a) = C
0
TP(qTP) ⇒ ˆ qTP(p − a), ˆ q
0
TP(p − a) > 0 (2)
ˆ qTP(p−a) is the proﬁt-maximizing supply of the third party and, hence, its monotonically
increasing supply function.
A household’s demand can be derived in similar fashion.5. The households maximize net
utility6
U(qHH) − pqHH (3)
which yields the ﬁrst order condition
U
0(qHH) − p = 0 ⇒ ˆ qHH(p), ˆ q
0
HH(p) < 0 (4)
where ˆ qHH(p) is the monotonically decreasing demand function.
To keep the model tractable, we assume the following:
assumption 1 The household’s aggregated demand function ˆ qHH(p) and the third party‘s
supply function ˆ qTP(p−a) are linear, i.e. the second derivatives of both functions are zero.
4Without loss of generality we assume that the third party consists of one supplier. The main feature
of competitiveness consists in that TP takes the market price as exogenously given.
5As for the small supplier, we assume that only one household demands gas.
6Without loss of generality we assume that gas is an income-neutral good.
43.2 Bilateral monopoly
In addition to the third party and households, the gas market participants consist of
the monopolistic gas supplier oﬀering qBGW (Association of the German Gas and Water
Industry) and the monopsonistic demanding qV IK (Association of Industry Energy and
Power Users). Notice that in this scenario the domestic gas producer ”BGW” also owns
the network. The market equilibrium is characterized by the following equation:7
qV IK + ˆ qHH(p) = ˆ qTP(p − a) + qBGW (5)
Notice that the equilibrium is achieved by the gas price p. Hence, p is a function of qV IK,
qBGW and a. To be more precise
p = p(∆,a), ∆ ≡ qV IK − qBGW (6)
where ∆ is the net demand of the association (VIK and BGW) in the gas market. This
demand must be met by the net supply ˆ qTP(p − a) − ˆ qHH(p) which is supplied by the
competitive fringe (see (5)).

















∆ > 0 (8)
(7) and (8) show how the equilibrium price depends on the gas quantities demanded by
the members of the association agreement (net demand) and on the access fee. The signs
conform with the intuition. Rising net demand increases the gas price and higher access
fees lead to same result as well.
Both big players, the monopsony (VIK) and the monopoly (BGW) set their quantities in
a non-cooperative manner. In fact, they are playing a Nash-Cournot game exploiting the
competitive fringe, which is deﬁned by its non-strategic supply and demand functions.
The Nash-Cournot-game can be deﬁned as follows:
max
qBGW
[p(∆,a)qBGW + aˆ qTP − CBGW(qBGW) − CN(qBGW + ˆ qTP)] (9)
max
qV IK
[πV IK(qV IK) − p(∆,a)qV IK] (10)
where CBGW is the convex cost function of BGW’s gas production and where CN are
capacity costs of the transportation network. πV IK(qV IK) is the concave proﬁt function
of the industrial energy users VIK. Notice, that ˆ qTP depends on p as deﬁned in (6). Hence,
(9) and (10) depend only on qBGW and qV IK. In the following we apply the:
assumption 2 The capacity costs of gas transportation are, in the long run, linear, i.e.
C00
N = 0. The third party’s marginal costs of gas production are lower than the marginal
production costs of BGW, i.e. ∀q : C0
TP(q) < C0
BGW(q).
7If one neglects leakage within the gas distribution system the market equilibrium condition is equiv-
alent to the mass balance identity.
5From the ﬁrst order conditions we can derive the N-C-equilibrium {qbi
BGW,qbi
V IK} (where
















∆] = 0 (11)
π
0
V IK − p
bi − qV IKp
bi
∆ = 0 (12)
where pbi = p(∆bi,a),∆bi = qbi
V IK − qbi
BGW.
To summarize, together with equations (2), (4), and (5), the ﬁrst order conditions (11)
and (12) form the gas market equilibrium if the two big players act strategically. This
equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1 with the help of reaction curves8 derived from the two
ﬁrst order conditions. From (11) we can derive the optimal response of qBGW for a given
qV IK, which is denoted by qBGW(qV IK). Similar, VIK’s reaction curve qV IK(qBGW) can
be derived from (12). Finally, the associations net demand ∆bi = qbi
V IK − qbi
BGW can be
measured along the vertical axis by a 45◦-line through the equilibrium point BI which
makes it possible to read oﬀ the price p(∆,a) in the left half of the ﬁgure.
3.3 A purely competitive market
It is instructive to compare the allocation of the cartelized market with a purely com-
petitive market where all participants take the price as given. This case is relevant if
competition policy (ex-post regulation) is eﬀective and can successfully assure an ideal
market. In this case, the gas provided by the gas supply association BGW must be derived
from the maximization program
pqBGW + aqTP − CBGW(qBGW) − CN(qBGW + qTP) (13)






N = 0 ⇒ ˆ qBGW(p), ˆ q
0
BGW(p) > 0 (14)
Similarly, the demand of VIK can be derived from maximizing its total proﬁts
πV IK(qV IK) − pqV IK (15)
for a given gas price p. The demand can be derived from the ﬁrst-order condition
π
0
V IK(qV IK) − p = 0 ⇒ ˆ qV IK(p), ˆ q
0
V IK(p) < 0 (16)
proposition 1 (More competition does not imply a lower gas price) Assume that
a ≥ C0
N, i.e. total access fees cover at least the network costs. Then the transition from a
cartelized market to a fully competitive market may lead to a higher or lower market price.
Total supply may rise or fall. Of course, welfare will increase with more competition.
8The characteristics of these curves are summarized in the appendix.
6Proof: We conﬁne ourselves to a graphical proof9. For this purpose we have to consider the
optimality conditions (11), (12) and (14) and (16). It can easily be shown that (11) and (12)




N > 0 (17)
π0
V IK(qbi
V IK) − pbi > 0 (18)
Due to the assumed properties of the relevant functions (14) must lie to the right of BGW’s
reaction function. Similarly, (16) is somewhere above VIK’s reaction curve. An example is shown
in the ﬁgure (thin lines). Thus, in a competitive equilibrium both qBGW and qV IK increase,
leaving the eﬀect on net demand ∆ undetermined. In our example ∆ is rising.



































































































To summarize: there is no doubt that more competition increases total welfare. Nev-
ertheless, the ﬁgure shows that more competition generates both winners and losers. If
net demand ∆ increases (decreases) in the process of rising competition, the third party
(households) is (are) the winner(s).
9The formal proof is based on the mean-value theorem for functions with severable variables and can
be obtained from the authors upon request.
73.4 Association Agreement
The German association agreement can be modeled within a two-stage time-structure.
First, the agreement is settled comprising long-term contracts on gas deliveries between
the monopolistic supplier (BGW) and the monopsonistic buyer (VIK) and a stipulated
access fee, which applies to all suppliers, the non-discriminatory access.
In the second stage the gas market will unfold as described in subsection 3.2. The market
is characterized by two major players: the monopolistic supplier and the monopsonistic
buyer. They choose supply and demand strategically, taking into account their reaction
(Nash strategies) and the reaction of a competitive fringe consisting of a third party
supplying gas and households demanding gas.
The agreement is modelled as a two-stage game to assure self-enforcement. Long-term
contracts are legal and hence feasible. Similarly, the German legislation provides for self-
regulation, which makes it possible to stipulate an enforceable access fee a. Conversely,
future supply and demand decisions in the gas market can not be stipulated ex ante (cartel
instability). Hence, these options can only be anticipated. In our deterministic model,
this is done by the precise forecast of the second period’s Nash equilibrium.




V IK) − p
biq
bi








BGW + ˆ qTP) + T − ¯ ΠBGW)
by choosing the access fee a and money transfer T; ¯ ΠV IK and ¯ ΠBGW are the threat points
of the industrial gas consumers and the supplier, respectively. In our deterministic model,
T can always be ﬁxed by a long-term contract11 specifying a certain amount of gas q0
purchased by V IK and delivered by BGW for a stipulated price p0. Notice that this
delivery does not need to take place physically. In the second period, V IK (BGW)
simply buys (sells) q0 at market price pbi and the contract is settled by a ﬁnancial close-
out of (p0 − pbi)q0. Hence, the long-term contract can be modelled as a simple ﬁnancial
transfer.
Before proceeding, the threat points ¯ ΠV IK and ¯ ΠBGW need some explanation. The Ger-
man system of self-regulation is a bargaining process under the threat that the public
legislator will introduce an ex-ante regulation scheme if the private players do not reach
an appropriate agreement. In this case, the access fee a will be set by a regulatory body.
As a result, the respective proﬁts can be anticipated by calculating the non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium given the access fee areg set by a future regulatory authority. This fee
will probably be close to marginal transportation costs, i.e. areg = C0
N. Moreover, substi-
tuting a public regulatory framework for self-regulation may foster further competition in
10In this paper we do not go into details on how the axiomatic bargaining approach models the ﬁnal
outcome of a sequential non-cooperative bargaining process.
11In the context of a two period model, this contract is in fact a simple forward contract. Moreover, in
the framework of our deterministic two-period model many problems of long term contracts are assumed
away (contract length, options, take-or-pay provisions etc.).
8the gas market, either through an accompanying competition policy (ex post regulation)
or through the signaling eﬀects encouraging potential gas producers to enter the market.
Also, the intrinsic cartel instability of the big buyers might intensify competition on the
demand side. If this scenario applies, then the threat points refer to proﬁts under full
competition (see eqs. (13) and (15)).
In the following, we assume that the threat points are determined by a cartelized market
under access-fee regulation (areg = C0
N). From the ﬁrst-order conditions of (19), one can










a − 1) = 0 (20)
proposition 2 (Association Agreement) The association agreement sets aaa > C0
N,
which implies the exploitation of households since the gas market price pbi increases with
respect to a reference case of a ﬁrst-best access fee a = C0
N. How the net price pbi−a reacts
on a depends on the curvatures of the proﬁt function πV IK and the cost function CBGW.
As a result, the third party may in fact gain from an association agreement compared to
the case of state-run regulation of the cartelized market.
Proof: See appendix.
4 Policy mix
The recent discussion on deregulation of networks industries diﬀerentiates between ex-ante
and ex-post regulation. While the former refers to classical price regulation, the latter
involves ”only” active competition policy. In our model, we take into account both kinds
of policy measures. Ex ante regulation is modeled as introducing a price cap which in
fact leads to a lower access fee a whereas competition policy results in a more competitive
market structure. Here, we assume the textbook case of a competitive market where all
participants take the gas price as given.
The following table combines the two policy measures and their joint impact on the gas
price.
Figure 2 (Policy mix)
ex-ante regulation
yes no
competition policy yes pbi may rise or fall pbi may rise or fall
(ex-post regulation) no pbi decreases as a is lowered association agreements (aa)
net price pbi − a may rise or fall
We begin from the bottom right corner, the status quo, i.e. the self-regulating cartel of
BGW and VIK. From there, one can read oﬀ the eﬀects of both policy types. Competi-
tion policy without ex-ante regulation (upper right corner) leads to an ambiguous price
12See appendix.
9movement, pbi may rise or fall (cf. Figure 1). Of course, the welfare impacts are clear-
cut as more competition increases total welfare deﬁned as the sum of all proﬁts (minus
ﬁxed costs) and consumer surplus. Nevertheless, there are winners and losers depending
on the price movement in the process of increasing competition. This is an interesting,
counter-intuitive result: self-regulation may beneﬁt the third party when compared with
a pro-active competition policy.
Also, ex-ante regulation has its own ambiguities. If the access fee a is lowered, for example
by introducing a price cap, then the gas price drops, which in turn leads to an increase
of consumer surplus. Whether the third party gains from this price reduction depends on
the relative size of the decrease. If p drops faster than a, then the TP will loose and vice
versa.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have compared diﬀerent regulatory settings for a network industry, based
on a stylized representation of the regulatory process in the German gas industry. The
point of inception was self-regulation of the network access price by the incumbent gas
production and transmission monopolist (BGW) and the large industrial users (VIK),
a situation we have called ”bilateral monopoly”. This approach to self-regulation has
been widely criticized for discriminating against third party gas producers and household
consumers. We compare the point of inception with ex-ante regulation, and, alternatively,
with no regulation but a pro-active competition policy.
We ﬁnd that the move from an unregulated bilateral monopoly to a fully competitive
market does not necessarily lead to lower market prices, and that total supply may in fact
rise or fall. Thus it appears clear that more competition increases welfare. Also, ex-ante
regulation of network access prices has an ambiguous eﬀect on the net price so that the
welfare position of the third party may or may not be enhanced. When analyzing the self-
regulated association agreement, we ﬁnd that it leads to an exploitation of households,
but that the eﬀect on the third party gas producer is unclear. In fact, the latter may even
gain from self-regulated access. We conclude that abandoning the association agreements
and moving to ex-ante regulation increases welfare, but does not necessarily improve the
situation of the third-party producers. Since ex-ante regulation may suﬀer from inherent
information asymmetries (a case that we have not treated here), self-regulation may in
fact be a feasible second-best solution for network access regulation.
The results have a couple of interesting policy conclusions. The analysis of a regulatory
model needs to be accompanied by an analysis of the prevailing market structure. Self-
regulation has a tendency to be welfare-decreasing in the ﬁrst-best world of regulation;
however, it does have certain advantages in a second-best world: transaction costs gains
have to be weighted against the potential welfare losses. Instead of prescribing a ”one-
ﬁts-all” regulatory model, the European Commission, and other governments, might be
well-advised to foster a variety of institutional models, from which an appropriate one
may emerge in every country or region.
We have left some issues open that merit further analysis. The idealtype model yields
10a deterministic solution, and does not take into account information asymmetry. Both
assumptions might be dropped to render the model more realistic. The topic of regulatory
threat, discussed at the outset of this paper, could be investigated fruitfully by looking
at additional constellations between the industry player, the Cartel Oﬃce, the potential
regulator, and the government. An intermediate result of deregulation, i.e. a cartel on
the supply side and a larger cartel on the demand side, might also be a more realistic
representation of the current situation. We have left aside the contract structure between
upstream and downstream market participants, leaving the opportunity for further re-
search to develop a dynamic version of this model. Last but not least, the model can be




To determine the shape of the reaction curves in Figure 1, it is necessary to diﬀerentiate the
ﬁrst-order conditions (11) and (12). Thus the price function p(∆,a) implicitly deﬁned by (5)
and Assumption 1 must be taken into account.
To determine the characteristics of qV IK(qBGW) we take qBGW as an exogenous variable and








V IK − 2pbi
∆
< 1 (21)











Notice that the reciprocal value of
dqBGW(qBGW)
dqV IK exceeds 1.
6.2 Derivation of Equation (20)
BGW and VIK maximize (19) with respect to {T,a}. Maximizing with respect to T leads to
πV IK(qbi
V IK)−pbiqbi





If one utilizes the envelope theorem (i.e. takes into account eqs. (11) and (12)) and (23) it is an
easy exercise to show that (20) is the ﬁrst order condition of (19) with respect to a.
6.3 Proposition 2
To prove the ﬁrst part insert (2) into (11). This yields
(C0
TP − C0
BGW) + (aaa − C0
N)(1 − ˆ q0
TPp∆) − qBGWp∆ = 0 (24)
11Notice that all relevant functions are evaluated at the Nash equilibrium {qbi
BGW,qbi
V IK}. Assume
per contradiction that avv ≤ C0
N. From (24) and (8) it follows that C0
TP − C0
BGW > 0 and, by
assumption 2, ˆ qTP > qbi
BGW. From (20) we can infer that
−pbi
a ∆bi + ˆ qTP < 0 → −∆bi + ˆ qTP = −qbi
V IK + qbi
BGW + ˆ qTP < 0 (25)
Inserting (5) into (25) leads to −ˆ qHH < 0 which is not true. Hence, aaa > C0
N.
To prove a decrease of the gas price as the access fee is lowered, one has to carry out a compar-
ative static analysis of equations (11) and (12). Diﬀerentiating with respect to a and recalling
Assumption 1, we arrive at
"
(π00

















































where Σ is the determinant of the system matrix. It can be shown that Σ is unambiguously
positive. Hence, gas demand and gas supply of the big player is decreasing with respect a.
To prove the stated relation between pbi and a, one has to diﬀerentiate pbi totally with respect



















The reaction of the net price p − a can be found by diﬀerentiating totally and inserting (29).










which exhibits an ambiguous sign.
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